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PROSPECTIVE REMEDIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
DOUG RENDLEMAN* 
The archetypal constitutional plaintiff represents a class, sues 
in federal court, and asks the court to declare something unconsti-
tutional and to effect a remedy against a local or state government 
official. If this litigant succeeds, the court must accommodate its 
remedy to federalism's perquisites. The remedy should advance 
some substantive or constitutional purpose. The mutual respect 
compelled by federalism exacerbates the inherent difficulties of 
attaining a successful remedy. This article examines the remedial 
relationships between class actions, declaratory judgments, ana 
injunctions. 
The remedial task is to convert law into results. Most people 
comply with the law when it is communicated and known. Federal-
ism operates without friction when state and local officials respect 
and enforce federal law. But law is often out of touch with individ-
ual, cultural, or regional values: prohibition was widely ignored; 
school prayers continue; and school desegregation still faces wide-
spread opposition. 
Stare decisis means that courts tend to follow earlier deci-
sions. Unless a higher court in the hierarchy has decided a binding 
precedent, however, a court need only follow an older case if "cor-
rect." Even "binding" precedent merely tells a court what to do; 
it says nothing coercive to a layman. 
The bitter-end defendant poses the remedial dilemma. For 
example, four years after the Supreme Court held the Virginia 
miscegenation statute unconstitutional, 1 a white soldier and his 
black fiancee applied for a marriage license in Calhoun County, 
* Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. 
1 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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Alabama. The probate judge refused the license because it was 
"illegal." A deputy attorney general agreed, saying, "[ w]hen the 
U.S. Supreme Court rules in a case it is just binding on people in 
that particular case . . . . They don't just wipe these laws off the 
books all over the United States because of one ruling."2 
When people deny precedential value, a stiffer prospective 
remedy is in order to ensure compliance. Courts have several reme-
dies. Simply "taking over" is probably the most extreme judicial 
remedy. The legal word for a judicial takeover is receivership, 
managed by a receiver or a master. Courts usually use receivers in 
economic insolvency; a receiver for a moral or constitutional bank-
rupt would be an innovation. Federal courts almost always refuse 
to appoint receivers to state and local government posts.3 
Second, the court may enjoin and compel the defendants, at 
the risk of contempt, to do, to forebear, or to cease. Litigants and 
courts favor injunctions, the central prospective remedy. 
Third, the court may merely declare, telling the parties how 
the law affects the controversy. Declaratory judgments are an 
emerging constitutional remedy. 4 
Several "persuasive" techniques make up the fourth alterna-
tive. A court may do nothing except retain jurisdiction, obviously 
implying, "I am keeping my eye on you."5 The court may also 
appoint monitors or observers, or ask the parties to form commit-
tees, to file periodic reports, and to submit plans. These alterna-
tives may be summoned alone or in combination with declaring 
and enjoini~g. 6 
2 Tuscaloosa News Dec. 4, 1971 at 1, col. 1. A few days later, a federal district 
court held the Alabama statute unconstitutional. United States v. Brittain, 319 F. 
Supp. 1058 (N.D. Ala. 1970). 
3 See Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 
F.2d 1305, 1317 (5th Cir. 1974). Courts may use "monitors" or committees to force 
defendants to share authority. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. 
Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 25 (2d Cir. 1971). But see Schumacher, Court Takes Ouer 
S. Boston High, Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 1; Note, 24 RUT. L. REV. 
115 (1969). 
~ See, e.g., Alsager v. District Court, 518 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir. 1975). 
• See, e.g., Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 550, 562 (D. Md. 1965). Less 
infatuated with moral suasion, the court of appeals remanded with orders to enter 
an injunction. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). 
• See generally, Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree 
Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975). 
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CLASS ACTIONS 
Class actions are not precisely remedies, but- enhance reme-
dies by spreading the judgment's effect beyond named parties. A 
class action's primary purpose is to aggregate small claims into a 
plaintiff class, an economically feasible litigation unit.7 Litigants 
use class actions for substitutionary relief. If declaratory relief es-
tablishes liability for money damages, a plaintiff class expands the 
benefitted group.8 Conversely, an unsuccessful plaintiff's class ac-
tion to recover money gives the defendant res judicata protection 
from a subsequent action by a class member.9 
In Caesar v. Kiser, 10 plaintiff charged that the North Carolina 
mechanic's lien statute was unconstitutional. The court declared 
the statutes unconstitutional in part, holding that plaintiff was 
entitled to recover damages, but declined plaintiff's request for a 
class action: "Since this action attacks the constitutionality of a 
statute, the effect of the declaratory judgment, in reality, provides 
the same relief for all persons who are affected by the statute. The 
request for a class action is, therefore, not necessary and is de-
nied."11 
The declaration and money damages in Caesar v. Kiser made 
the named plaintiff "whole." What was the point of the class ac-
tion? The group aggrieved by the named defendant was probably 
not large. The contemplated plaintiff class here would have added 
little to the declaration-damage remedy and maintenance of a 
class action would have injected new issues into the trial. 
To allow money recovery for sales before the statute was de-
clared unconstitutional, the court would have had to ignore persu-
asive precedent12 and hold the decision retroactive. To expand re-
covery damage further, plaintiff should have sued defendant class 
of garage owners, with someone on plaintiff's side paying the bill 
7 Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941). 
• See, e.g., Brown v. Liberty Loan of Duval, 392 F. Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla. 
1974). 
0 7A C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1789 
(1972). 
•• 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975). 
11 I d. at 650. See also Abbit v. Bernier, 387 F. Supp. 57, 59 n.2. (D. Conn. 1974). 
12 Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972). 
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for notice. 13 When defendants received notice, they may have 
argued against inclusion. u 
It may be difficult, as a practical matter, to attain full compli-
ance with the decision in Caesar v. Kiser. If the decision is commu-
nicated effectively and if all garage owners are willing to obey, then 
the precedent will be effective. But consumers are diffuse and often 
poorly informed. A garage owner, either ignorant or unscrupulous, 
may act inconsistently with the holding. 
Plaintiff, for law reform reasons, may seek to enjoin a defend-
ant class to extend injunctive control over larger groups. 15 But a 
defendant class may not add much to an injunction against named 
defendants. Whether or not plaintiff represents a class, ending the 
harm for one may benefit many; 16 when a single plaintiff persuades 
a court to abate defendant's smoking chimney, all the neighbors 
breathe fresher air. Even though relief is not class based, courts 
may shape an injunction to benefit nonparties. 17 
Procedural devices which create almost the same effect as a 
defendant class exist to compel compliance with an injunction. 
Rule 25(d) substitutes a governmental defendant's successor as 
defendant and exposes a breaching successor to contempt. 18 Rule 
65(d) compels employees and cohorts to obey.l9 Rule 65(d), how-
ever, requires notice of the injunction which may dilute contempt 
as a sanction. 20 
13 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974). 
" FEo. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A). Even though rule 23, by its terms only, requires 
notice in (b)(3) or damage actions, some courts have insisted that due process also 
requires notice in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin 
391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968). 
15 See, e.g., Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 
u.s. 929 (1966). 
11 See, e.g., Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963); Hoehle v. Likins, 405 
F. Supp. 1167, 1175 (D. Minn. 1975); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. 
Supp. 1191, 1200 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
•r See, e.g., Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200, 1207 (lOth Cir. 1973). 
" Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 843 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Lucy v. Adams, 
224 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff'd per curiam sub nom, McCorvey v. Lucy, 
328 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1964). 
" Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 844 (N.D. Fla. 1975); Regal Knitwear Co. 
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945) (dicta). 
20 Garrigan v. United States, 163 F. 16, 21-23 (7th Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 214 
u.s. 514 (1909). 
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Plaintiffs may consider a defendant class to achieve effective 
relief against all who may frustrate the right asserted but even this 
tactic is not perfect. Rules 25( d) and 65( d) do not reach diffused, 
private defendants. Garage owners, for example, are not united by 
an agency relationship. Moreover, viewed from the other side, 
backing an injunction against a defendant class with contempt 
creates potential unfairness. Plaintiff chooses the representative 
and putative class members may lack a realistic opportunity to 
litigate the injunction. 
Defendant classes create immense problems of notice, com-
munication, enforcement, and fairness in contempt. The class 
shifts the focus from a plaintiff's personal grievance to the collec-
tive grievances of the class. Given these additional difficulties in-
herent in class actions, it should suprise no one that courts are 
reluctant to grant injunctive relief against a class especially where 
the court may be content, as in Caesar v. Kiser, with individual 
redress and the educational effect of a declaratory judgment. 
Many of the class action's virtues are ephemeral, speculative, 
or adequately performed by other devices. If plaintiff omits the 
class action, will nonparties be injured or prejudiced? Dissatisfied 
nonparties need not stand idly outside a nonclass suit gnashing 
their teeth. They may, if adequately connected to the controversy, 
intervene as plaintiffs or defendants and participate as parties. 
Even after judgment, nonparties may be allowed to intervene to 
appeal,21 or to alter or modify an injunction.22 Alternatively, non-
parties with plaintiff interests may file a second suit against the 
same defendants and ask the court to preclude those defendants 
from relitigating issues adjudicated in the first suit. 23 
Class actions have several incidental benefits. A class of plain-
tiffs makes the case more difficult to moot when the named plain-
tiff graduates, gets a haircut or promotion, or leaves the state. 24 If 
a court allows mailed rather than served notice, a class of defend-
ants may be cheaper to sue. Finally, if both plaintiffs and defend-
ants are classed, plaintiff's lawyer can pick names to style the 
21 Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
22 FED. R. C1v. P. 60(b)(5); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 
(1932). 
%l Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 
u.s. 313 (1971). 
21 Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553, 556-59 (1975). 
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lawsuit cleverly. A lot may be said for a case named Sherman v. 
Atlanta. 
At times defendant classes are indispensable to effective 
relief. One commentator states, "Where a question of law is deci-
sive . . . , the concept of stare decisis furnishes almost the same 
advantages as a class action .... [A] decision on the law effec-
tively binds non-parties without upsetting our assurance that due 
process has been done . . . . " 25 
As comparing Schneider v. Margossian26 with Callahan v. 
Wallace27 reveals, such faith in precedent as a remedy is touching 
but perhaps naive. In Schneider, the issue was whether it was 
constitutional for a plaintiff to attach or garnish a defendant's 
bank account without notice to defendant. Such ex parte process, 
the court held, violated due process. The plaintiff sued all court 
clerks as a class. The state Attorney General told the clerks and 
sheriffs to cease issuing and serving the writs. The court denied 
plaintiff's request for a class of clerks, saying "we are not per-
suaded by the prospect of other district court clerks proceeding in 
disregard of our decision . . . . "28 Denying the plaintiff the oppor-
tunity to sue a defendant class in Schneider, the court expressed 
its confidence that communicated precedent was sufficient to end 
the unconstitutional practice. 
Callahan presents a contrast. In 1966, a federal court enjoined 
an Alabama justice of the peace from trying infractions because, 
the court held, it was unconstitutional for the justice of the peace 
to collect fees only for convictions. 29 In 1968, another federal court 
held the Alabama statutes unconstitutional and enjoined the 
named defendants from proceeding in justice of the peace courts. 30 
In 1969, the Supreme Court affirmed the second case.31 
"[T]he then Attorney General of Alabama," the Callahan 
court said, "took no action, or very belated action, to inform jus-
tices generally tha~ they should cease the trial of traffic cases." 
25 Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BuFF. 
L. REV. 433, 446 (1960). 
2
' 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972). 
27 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972). 
2.< 349 F. Supp. at 746. 
20 Hulett v. Julian, 250 F. Supp. 208 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
•• Bennett v. Cottingham, 290 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Ala. 1968). 
31 Bennett v. Cottingham, 393 U.S. 317 (1969). 
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Further "there was evidence that in answer to specific inquires the 
Attorney General advised that the Supreme Court case applied 
only to the county in which the defendant justices resided. "32 Sher-
iffs and troopers continued to lodge and try charges in justice 
courts. 
Callahan was brought to stop this. All justices of the peace, 
all sheriffs, the public safety director, and other state officials 
comprised the defendant class. The court of appeals affirmed full 
injunctive relief against the defendant class.33 
Plaintiffs' attorneys contributed not to the development of 
new law but to the enforcement of existing law. With a class action, 
they enjoined everybody with a capacity to thwart plaintiffs' 
constitutional right, and established the proposition that the 
United States Supreme Court's decisions apply in all parts of the 
state of Alabama. 34 
In Schneider and Callahan, the courts respectively denied and 
granted the inclusion of defendant classes. Those decisions turned 
on whether the court thought action against a class necessary to 
enforce an injunction and to attain compliance with the law. If 
people obey without more, precedent suffices; a defendant class to 
enlarge the ambit of injunctive relief is unnecessary. Habitual and 
insolent resistance, however, evokes sterner measures. 
INJUNCTIONS AND DECLARATIONS 
A declaratory judgment is a remedy or a procedural tool hid-
ing behind a remedy. A declaration may serve as a foundation for 
an injunction or damages. Declaratory relief, formerly concealed 
within suits to quite title, to rescind, to interplead and to reform, 
has emerged as an independent, freestanding remedy. 
Two types of litigants seek declaratory relief-plaintiffs who 
could sue for damages or an injunction but disdain to do so and 
people embroiled in an actual controversy which has not developed 
to the stage at which someone could seek damages or an injunc-
tion. A declaratory judgment is a final judicial determination clari-
fying and settling legal relations by telling the parties to a contro-
32 466 F.2d at 61 and n.2. 
33 ld. at 62. 
31 ld. 
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versy what their rights and obligations are.35 Declarations refine 
precedent by identifying the people and the problem. 
A plaintiff may ask a court for either declaratory or injunctive 
relief before suffering actual injury. Both, as discussed here, lack 
substitutionary features and are prospective remedies. Before ei-
ther enjoining or declaring, courts insist upon an actual, mature, 
or ripe controversy; courts disdain to enjoin or declare in response 
to hypothetical, abstract or green questions.36 
Callahan answered the question whether an injunction adds 
anything to declaration. If all were law abiding, a declaration 
would be the equivalent of an injunction.37 But the world is not 
such a pleasant place. Violation of a declaration is not contempt.38 
Injunctions command parties to obey. If parties violate an injunc-
tion, the court may hold them in contempt. In the abstract, an 
injunction may be viewed as a declaration backed by a contempt 
sanction. 
Before declarations became accepted, courts said that without 
contempt, injunctions would merely advise.39 Today, however, ob-
servers view the noncoercive declaration as virtuous. Courts and 
commentators frequently say that the declaratory judgment is the 
more civilized and milder remedy.40 Professor Borchard put it this 
way: "The adjudication, not the command, is the essence of judi-
cial power, and in our civilized communities, it is the adjudication, 
and not the command, which evokes respect and official sanction, 
because it is a determination by the societal agent appointed to 
perform that function, and thus irrevocably fix legal relations."41 
Declarations may lack an injunction's contempt teeth, but a so-
ciety committed to the rule of law should not always need a bite 
to back up its bark. 
,. E. BoRCHARD, DECLARATORY JuDGMENTS 299 (1934). 
3
' Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458-460 (1974); Chacon v. Granata, 515 
F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Ad., 391 F. Supp. 856, 
864 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Fletcher v. Bealey, 28 Ch. 688 (1885). Cf., Rondeau v. Mossi-
nee Paper Corp., 95 S. Ct. 2069, 2075 (1975); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 
u.s. 629 (1953). 
37 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 22 (1972). 
"" Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1974). 
3
' Gompers v._Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). 
•• See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 467 (1974). 
11 E. BoRCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 10 (1934). 
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Because we distinguish between injunctions as coercive and 
declarations as noncoercive, the sanctions and prospective effect of 
those rulings differ. To preserve a controversy for adjudication, 
procedure allows preliminary injunctions and temporary restrain-
ing orders before final judgment.~2 Violation of these interlocutory 
orders is contempt. 43 Because declarations neither compel nor 
forbid conduct, there are no interlocutory declarations punishable 
by contempt.44 
Applying the doctrine of res judicata to a declaration may 
convert it from an advisory opinion into a judgment in the tradi-
tional sense.45 But because injunctions guide conduct in a changing 
future, some observers think res judicata inapposite for injunc-
tions. 46 
A declaration may be easier to obtain than an injunction. 
Equity limits the granting of injunctions. Plaintiff must be threat-
ened with "irreparable injury" and reveal "clean hands" before a 
court will enjoin. But these limits do not circumscribe correspond-
ing declaratory relief. 47 Second, because a court intrudes less when 
declaring than when enjoining, a single federal judge may declare 
a state statute unconstitutional; to enjoin state authorities from 
enforcing the same statute a three judge panel must be convened. 48 
Courts recognize that there are times when it is propitious to 
declare but unseemly to enjoin. In Powell v. McCormack, 49 the 
question was whether the United States House of Representatives 
n FED. R. C1v. P. 65(a),(b). 
13 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1946). 
u But cf., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 2561 (1975). (Preliminary injunc-
tion in declaratory judgment case). 
15 Ma Chuck Moon v. Dulles, 237 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 
U.S. 1002 (1957); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 77 (1942); 
E. BoRCHARD, DECLARATORY JuDGMENTS 10-11 (1934); S. Rep. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. 2 (1934). 
1
' Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1080-81 (1965); 
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 54(b) (1942). 
n Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471-72 (1974); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Hayworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937); Age of Majority Educational Corp. v. Preller, 
512 F.2d 1241, 1245 (4th Cir. 1975); Airways Theatre Inc. v. Canale, 366 F. Supp. 
343, 346-47 (W.D. Tenn. 1973). But cf., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73 
(1971). 
1
" Alsager v. District Court, 518 F.2d 1160, 1166 (8th Cir. 1975); Age of Majority 
Educational Corp. v. Preller, 512 F.2d 1241, 1245 (4th Cir. 1975). 
19 395 u.s. 486 (1969). 
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had power to exclude a duly elected person who met the age, citi-
zenship, and residency qualifications. The Supreme Court re-
versed a court of appeals decision that the political question doc-
trine barred relief and remanded for further proceedings. Appar-
ently recognizing the hazards implicit in officiously interposing, 
the Court stated that "a Court may grant declaratory relief even 
though it chooses not to issue an injunction."50 
The United States Supreme Court has refined its ability to 
declare instead of enjoin in one abstruse but crucial type of pro-
ceeding: suits in which a present or potential state criminal de-
fendant asks a federal court to relieve him from a state prosecu-
tion. The federal courts in those cases must integrate their duty 
to protect citizens' constitutional rights with separation of powers 
and federalism interests of the highest order. The Court distin-
guished injunctive from declaratory relief, saying "a federal dis-
trict court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the 
merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as 
to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction."51 
In Roe v. Wade52 and Doe v. Bolton, 53 the Court stated the 
J.:eason for separating the remedial questions. The Court held that 
the statutes which forbade almost all abortions were unconstitu-
tional. The district court had declared without enjoining. The 
Court approved. "[W]e assume," the majority observed, "the 
Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full credence to this deci-
sion that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State are 
unconstitutional. "54 
Justice Brennan, in his separate opinion in Perez v. Ledesma55 
and his majority opinion in Steffel v. Thompson, 56 distinguished 
"" 395 U.S. at 499. 
51 Zwicker v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967). 
52 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
53 410 u.s. 179 (1973). 
5~ 410 U.S. at 166. The Court also mentioned that the statutes did not abridge 
free speech. !d. This may bear on the federal court's decision to intercede. But once 
the answer is affirmative, this observer cannot determine whether the fragile nature 
of first amendment freedoms provides a reason to distinguish one remedy from 
another. See also, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201-02 (1973) . 
.. 401 u.s. 82, 93-131 (1971). 
51 415 U.S. 452 (1974). See also Hicks v. Miranda, 95 S. Ct. 2281 (1975) 
(Younger applies if state suit begins before "proceedings of substance on the mer-
its" occur in federal court); Huffman v. Pursue, 95 S. Ct. 1200, 1207 n.16 (1975). 
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declaratory from injunctive relief. Steffel's holding is narrow: if 
state authorities threaten but have not commenced a criminal 
prosecution, then comity, equity, and federalism do not preclude 
a federal declaratory judgment that the prosecution or statute vio-
lates the Constitution, although those same principles might pre-
clude an injunction against an actual prosecution. 57 The reasoning 
is important. There are differences between declaratory and in-
junctive relief. Congress, when passing the declaratory judgment 
act, intended to supply federal litigants with a milder and less 
meddlesome remedy than the injunction. Thus, a declaration may 
be proper where an injunction is impolitic. 
Some generalizations emerge concerning declarations and in-
junctions in constitutional adjudication. The remedies are sepa-
rate. Declarations are less intrusive.58 Indeed, to declare without 
enjoining may be part of a judge's considerable remedial discre-
tion. 59 Courts begin to consider declaratory relief when an injunc-
tion may endanger inter- or intra-governmental relations. If it ap-
pears that the defendant will obey, an injunction may be officious 
and otiose; a declaration may suffice.60 
Lower courts declare without enjoining in a variety of circum-
stances, 61 and often render remedial decisions equivalent to decla-
rations without articulating the distinctions. 52 Judge Carven states 
57 415 u.s. 452, 475 (1974). 
•• Id. at 469; H.R. Rep. No. 1264, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) . 
., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 95 S. Ct. 2069, 2076-78 (1975); Hecht Co. 
v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944); 0. F'Iss, INJUNCTIONS 91-93 (1972); FEo. R. Crv. P. 
54( c). 
'
0 Alsager v. District Court, 518 F.2d 1160, 1165 (8th Cir. 1975). 
•• Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hunter, 459 
F.2d 205, 218-20 (4th Cir. 1971); Bunton v. First National Bank of Tampa 394, F. 
Supp. 793 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, 377 F. Supp. 613, 
629 (D.P.R. 1974); Airways Theatre Inc. v. Canale, 366 F. Supp. 343, 346-47 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1973); Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 110 (D.D.C. 1973); Smith v. U. of 
Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777, 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658, 
664-65 (W.D. Ky. 1967). 
'
2 Buckley v. Vales, 96 S. Ct. 612, 694 (1976) (30 day stay); Doe v. Poelker, 515 
F.2d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 1975) (Plaintiff withdrew request for injunction; court 
granted a declaration equivalent to an injunction); Compton v. Naylor, 392 F. 
Supp. 575, 578 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (ruling delayed for 6 months); Marin v. University 
of Puerto Rico, 377 F. Supp. 613, 628-29 (D.P.R. 1974) (mixed declaration and 
injunction); Washington Activity Group v. White, 342 F. Supp. 847, 854 (D.D.C. 
1971) (request for injunction suspended thirty days to allow defendants to consider 
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the reason in Turner v. Blackburn: "To enjoin the clerk of one of 
100 counties is unseemly and, we think, unnecessary. County and 
state officers of North Carolina are not, and never have been, indif-
ferent to the commands of the Constitution as interpreted and 
applied by either state or federal courts. Stare decisis in a state 
dedicated to the rule oflaw can be as effective, we think, as injunc-
tion."63 
Courts must decide whether to enjoin or declare. M Enjoining, 
when declaring will suffice, may create the impression that the 
defendant will ignore the decision unless threatened by sanctions. 
If, however, defendants ignore a declaration, someone must reen-
gage them in time and money, consuming additionallitigation/5 
perhaps stirring local passions in the process.66 Moreover, courts 
should err on strictness' side because a society which relies on 
litigants to comply voluntarily cannot ignore defiant losers. If the 
declaratory judgment is the court's civilized remedy, then assur-
ance of public adherence to the rule of law is the key to the use of 
that remedy. 
As Professor Whitten points out, the Steffel opinion fails to 
distinguish fully between enjoining and declaring.67 But Steffel 
insists that declarations are less intrusive than injunctions. This 
general statement subsumes the absence of the contempt sanction. 
Moreover, the differences are not as clear as pure logic might 
impel. 
"whether they wish to take any action in accordance with the principles set forth 
in this opinion"). 
13 389 F. Supp. 1256, 1261 (W.D.N.C. 1975). 
" Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534, 537 (M.D. Pa. 1975); In United States 
v. Brittain, 319 F. Supp. 1058 (M.D. Ala. 1970), the Alabama miscegenation case 
discussed at n.l supra, the court: (1) declared the statute unconstitutional, (2) 
enjoined enforcement at the state level, and (3) required the Attorney General to 
advise all probate judges that the law was invalid. Judge Garrity of Schneider v. 
Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972), is desegregating the schools of 
Boston with an injunction backed by contempt; see Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 
618 (1st Cir. 1975). 
" See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Commission of Green County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970). 
" See, e.g., Cine Com Theatres Eastern States, Inc. v. Lordi, 351 F. Supp. 42 
(D. N.J. 1972), vacated and remanded, 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974); Hamar Thea-
tres v. Cryan, 365 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 416 U.S. 954 
(1974). 
07 See Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State 
Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 
N. CAR. L. REv. 591, 681, 685 (1975). 
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The separate opinions in Steffel reveal some disagreement 
about the declaratory judgment's attributes. Justice Rhenquist, 
concurring, asserted that declaratory judgments simply state 
rights and that federalism prevents a declaratory judgment that a 
prosecution is unconstitutional from becoming a foundation for a 
subsequent injunction.68 A declaratory judgment is merely persu-
asive, neither res judicata nor binding precedent.69 Justice White 
replied that a federal declaratory judgment is "more than a mere 
precedent"; indeed it "should be accorded res judicata effect in 
any later prosecution of that very conduct."70 Nor must the winner 
of a federal declaration rest upon a state court plea of res judicata: 
"it would not seem improper to enjoin local prosecutors who refuse 
to observe adverse federal judgments."71 
The majority opinion skated rapidly over the thin ice of res 
judicata and later injunctions. It merely accorded precedential 
effect to the declaration, stating that if the Supreme Court affirms 
a declaration that a prosecution is unconstitutional, then it will 
reverse any later criminal conviction.72 A more precise majority 
opinion might have destroyed unanimity. Justice White perceives 
a declaration as differing only a little from an injunction.73 Justice 
Rhenquist, on the other hand, views a declaration as an advisory 
opinion in an actual controversy.74 Justice Rhenquist repudiates 
Professor Borchard's idea that declarations are the civilized rem-
edy and overlooks the policy of interposing res judicata after one 
full "day in court" to prevent duplicative, potentially inconsistent 
adjudications75 and to ensure fairness, economy, and ultimately 
public respect. Justice White, it seems, holds the correct position. 
As a thoughtful note points out, Steffel's meaning depends on 
the preclusive effect of a declaration and whether a declaration 
may be the basis for a later injunction.76 Justice Rhenquist thinks 
that federal declarations are as legally binding as letters to the 
•• 415 U.S. at 479 . 
•• ld. 
70 I d. at 477. 
71 ld. at 478. 
n ld. at 470. 
73 Id. at 476-78. 
" I d. at 484. 
75 ld. at 478-85. A. VESTAL. REs .JUDICATA PRECLUSION 209-15 (1969); Whitten, 
supra note 67, at 682. 
" Note, RUTGERS L. REv. 720, 747-50 (1975). 
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editor of the local newspaper.77 But unless entitled to viability in 
res judicata situations, a declaration is an advisory opinion, uncon-
stitutional under the "case or controversy" requirement.78 Con-
gress, moreover, intended a declaration to be a foundation for an 
injunction.79 
To preserve the distinction between declarations and advisory 
opinions, declarations must mean something. But if an injunction 
automatically follows a declaration, then a declaration appears to 
be at least a nascent injunction. To preserve the distinction be-
tween declarations and injunctions, declarations may not be coer-
cive. Therein lies the dilemma. 
Contempt is the crucible of an injunction. The true test of an 
injunction is whether it will support contempt. If the difference 
between enjoining and declaring is that injunctions include sanc-
tions, then we may expect the courts to enforce violated injunc-
tions with contempt. 
We might assume from the few written opinions upholding 
contempt80 that this is a remarkably law abiding nation. Recent 
history, however, lays that canard to rest. And one who looks will 
find many opinions in which the court could, but fails to utilize 
contempt.81 The contempt cases reveal those charged to uphold the 
law setting court orders to naught. 
A strong policy of preserving respect for courts compels de-
fendants to obey injunctions.82 Scorning federal court orders strikes 
a blow at federalism. Federal courts must protect federally guaran-
teed rights. Flouting injunctions dilutes the rule of law. 
77 415 U.S. at 478-85. 
'" Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller u. 
California, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1838, 1865 (1975). 
" 28 U.S. 2202 (1970); Vermont Structural Slate Co. v. Tatco Bros. Slate Co., 
253 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1958). 
"' See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward Co., 363 F.2d 206 
(4th Cir. 1966); In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 379 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
•
1 See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1975); Therault v. 
Carlson, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 991 (5th 
Cir. 1965); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 842 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Spangler v. 
Pasadena City Board ofEduc., 384 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Calif. 1974); Class v. Norton, 
376 F. Supp. 496 (D. Conn. 1974); Wollfolk v. Brown, 358 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Va. 
1973); Garmon v. Warner, 358 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 
354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973); Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (D. Conn. 1970), 
appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 902 (1970). 
•
2 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
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If the courts are outraged, they successfully dissemble and 
mildly resort to a variety of less than draconian tactics. They im-
portune and remonstrate. They delay. They ignore the facts and 
find no intent or no willfulness. They convert criminal contempt 
into civil. They impose coercive contempt. This is, conceptually, 
a second injunction with the punishment specified,83 which allows 
the contemnor an opportunity to "purge" the contempt. Finally, 
they may enter a judgment of contempt without sanctions, observ-
ing that there is no sufficient reason to prosecute further. 84 All this 
contrasts starkly with the newspaper reporters who were punished 
for contempt simply because they exercised what they believed to 
be their constitutional rights.85 
The seeker after intelligible doctrine examines contempt opin-
ions in vain. A single generalization emerges: courts hesitate to use 
contempt against government officials. The remedial question is 
less what the law allows than what is politic. Contempt is an 
extradordinary remedy. "The very amplitude of the power," the 
Supreme Court said, "is a warning to use it with discretion, and a 
command never to exert it where it is not necessary or proper."86 
Contempt is a flexible remedy. Courts employ contempt to attain 
compliance, not to display retribution.87 Finally, when dealing 
with refractory state and local officials, contempt may be unwise 
for a different reason; the blood of the martyrs, it is often observed, 
was the seed of the church. 
A few questions arise.lf coercive remedies are a matter of what 
is politic, should the court consider in advance whether it will be 
willing to impose contempt for a violation? If unwilling, should it 
refuse to enjoin and merely declare? If courts are unwilling to 
utilize contempt, are injunctions really de facto declarations? 
Should courts continue to enjoin but be more willing to find con-
tempt and impose coercive sanctions? Or perhaps the courts 
should declare first under the least drastic means policy. Most 
people obey definitive statements of the law. Challenge to a decla-
113 0. FISS. INJUNCTIONS 763-64 (1972). 
•• United States v. Barnette, 346 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1965). 
•• United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972), 349 F. Supp. (M.D. 
La. 1972); 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973). 
•• Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911). 
"
7 Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 842-43 (M.D. Fla. 1975). 
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ration might lead to an injunction; and defiance of an injunction 
might be, in good conscience, contempt. 
CONCLUSION 
Precedent, class actions, declarations, and injunctions differ; 
but when abstract distinctions collide with remedial practicalities, 
the· differences become less apparent. Moreover, many of the dif-
ferences are of personal style and an articulated individual prefer-
ences which cannot be redacted in a word formula. Rules cannot 
accommodate the infinite variety of fact combinations. In the com-
plex and serious business of government through courts, all these 
devices lend remedial flexibility. This article lacks final answers 
to some of the basic questions posed but hopefully will provide 
guide for the search for a civilized yet effective remedial structure 
in constitutional adjudication. 
